Informe en el que el Comité pide que se le mantenga informado de la evolución de la situación - Informe núm. 284, Noviembre 1992

1. 459. In communications dated 31 October and 6 December 1991, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) submitted a complaint of violations of freedom of association against the Government of Canada (New Brunswick), on behalf of the National Union of Provincial Government Employees (NUPGE) and the New Brunswick Government Employees Union (NBGEU). The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the Public Services International (PSI) expressed their support of the complaint in communications dated respectively 8 and 12 November 1991.
2. 460. The federal Government, in a communication of 7 April 1992, transmitted the observations and information from the Government of New Brunswick.
3. 461. Canada has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87). It has not ratified the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151), or the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154).

A. The complainant's allegations

1. 462. In its communication of 31 October 1991, the complainant organisation alleges that the Government of New Brunswick violated Conventions Nos. 87, 98, 151 and 154 by enacting, on 6 June 1991, Bill No. 73, the Expenditure Management Act, hereafter called "the Act". (For ease of reference, the main substantive provisions of the Act, in particular those quoted and relied on by the complainant and the Government, are reproduced in the Annex to this document.)
2. 463. The complainant contends that the Act establishes a dangerous precedent and sets a negative tone for the future of labour relations in New Brunswick; its overall effect is to renege on existing legally signed collective agreements and severely to restrict in the future collective bargaining in the Province. The language of the Act reflects the consistent anti-union attitude which the Government has displayed in dealing with its employees in the field of labour relations.
3. 464. The legislation represents more than wage freezes. The Act delays by one year "all increases in the cost incurred by a public sector employer". This includes any anticipated increases in the employer's cost of providing shared benefit programmes, such as health insurance, pension contributions and life insurance. The legislation does not allow for collective bargaining to resume as normal after the 12-month freeze, and outlaws any attempt to negotiate catch-up increases following the one-year freeze.
4. 465. The legislation interferes with the right of a union to challenge the interpretation or the application of the Act. It allows the cabinet to make regulations respecting the determination of such questions. Furthermore, the Act gives rise to the question of free access to the courts by all citizens.
5. 466. The Act grants the Provincial Government absolute authority to establish wage and benefit levels of municipal workers without negotiations. It restricts the ability of a new bargaining agent to negotiate wage increases and benefits until one year after certification, virtually denying freedom of association.
6. 467. The Act does not represent a temporary measure, regardless of what the Government says. Opportunity exists throughout the legislation to allow the Government to implement at will further restrictive measures; the legislation has given the Government the right to nullify legally signed agreements.
7. 468. The Act is a repressive anti-union legislation which blames public servants for the provincial deficits and which clearly violates international labour standards. Prior to the enactment of the legislation the various unions representing public sector workers in New Brunswick provided the Government with a number of well thought out and comprehensive proposals which would have responded to the Government's perceived economic difficulties, while respecting the integrity of the collective bargaining system. The Government chose however to ignore those proposals and instead legislate away the right of public employees to bargain collectively.
8. 469. The complainant submits more specifically that the Act violates Articles 3 and 8 of Convention No. 87 by eliminating the right of trade unions to negotiate during the freeze period. Section 5(1) of the Act basically eliminates the reasons why workers join unions, i.e. to gain improved benefits and wages as a result of a collective effort. It directly contravenes Convention No. 87, in that it discourages workers from joining unions, thereby interfering with union programmes. The introduction of Bill No. 73 is exactly the type of interference by public authorities that is contemplated by Article 3(2) of the Convention, which the Government breached by dictating that arbitration boards operate within the Act. As the Committee previously stated: "The reservation of budgetary powers to the legislative authority should not have the effect of preventing compliance with collective agreements entered into by, or on behalf of, that public body." (Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, 3rd edition, 1985, para. 604.)
9. 470. The Government has clearly used its legislative authority to set aside existing collective agreements. Rather than examine all possible ways to address economic recovery in the Province, it chose to scapegoat public sector workers for the Province's economic difficulties, as "perceived" by the current Government. The Committee has in the past looked at stabilisation measures introduced by governments and has concluded that such measures ought to be taken only when necessary: "... stabilisation measures restricting the right to collective bargaining are acceptable on condition that they are of an exceptional nature, and only to the extent that they are necessary." (241st Report (Ontario), para. 115.) The complainant organisation considers that the enactment of Bill No. 73 was not the best way to deal with New Brunswick's economic concerns, nor will it promote economic recovery in a Province that is so dependent on the public sector.
10. 471. Furthermore, the Act does impair the guarantees provided for in Convention No. 87, contrary to Article 8 of the Convention, since it deprives public sector employees of their rights freely to organise and to associate.
11. 472. In addition, the Government breached Convention No. 98 as it did not encourage the settlement of differences but rather reneged on previously negotiated agreements. Moreover, the Act removed the independence of a third party dispute resolution mechanism. As previously stated by the Committee in a case concerning British Columbia: "... the exercise of financial powers by the public authorities in a manner that prevents compliance with collective agreements already entered into by public bodies is not consistent with the principles of free collective bargaining." (Digest, para. 640.)
12. 473. Similarly, by proclaiming legislation which puts collective agreements on hold for a year, the Government committed an act of interference, contrary to Article 5 of Convention No. 151.
13. 474. The complainant further alleges that the Act damages trust between the parties and gives the appearance of bargaining in bad faith on the part of the employer, i.e. negotiated agreements are not meaningful if they can be legislated away by one of the parties. Through its jurisprudence, the Committee considers the attitudes of the parties to be important to the process of settlement negotiation; it has pointed out in the past "the importance which it attaches to the principle that both employers and trade unions should bargain in good faith, making every effort to come to an agreement, and particularly when unions are not allowed to have recourse to strike action in the public service or in essential services. The Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission has emphasised that satisfactory labour relations depend primarily on the attitudes of the parties towards each other and on their mutual confidence." (Digest, para. 590.) Trade union members cannot have the least bit of confidence in bargaining with an employer who, in its dual role as legislature, takes away the right to free collective bargaining.
14. 475. Finally, the complainant submits that the Act contravenes the spirit of Convention No. 154, i.e. measures that ought to be taken to promote collective bargaining, and more specifically Article 5(2)(e) of that instrument, which states that: "Bodies and procedures for the settlement of labour disputes should be so conceived as to contribute to the promotion of collective bargaining." The complainant argues that the bodies and procedure referred to in that provision include arbitration. Certainly under the Act, arbitration cannot be seen as promoting collective bargaining because the process must be conducted within the confines of the Act. In addition, the Act violates Article 8 of Convention No. 154, which states that: "The measures taken with a view to promoting collective bargaining shall not be so conceived or applied as to hamper the freedom of collective bargaining."
15. 476. The complainant concludes that the Act is contrary to principles of international labour law and believes that blaming public sector workers for the provincial deficit is unjustified and unfair; principles of fairness would dictate that the Government attempt to negotiate in good faith with the bargaining agents for the public service. The complainant invites the Committee to remind the Government of the principles of fairness codified in ILO Conventions and Recommendations, to request that it repeal the Act and return to free collective bargaining.
16. 477. In its communication of 31 October 1991, the CLC mentioned that similar complaints were presented concerning five different Provinces and requested that they be examined separately. It emphasised however that, in the view of the labour movement and most independent labour relations professionals, labour relations in the public sector in Canada are rapidly deteriorating as governments in Canada are quick to enact legislation which denies or severely restricts collective bargaining in the public sector. The CLC believes that, in order for the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association to obtain an accurate account of the extent of the deterioration of the labour relations climate in Canada, it will be necessary to send its own independent mission to Canada sometime during the next several months. It therefore suggests that the Committee strongly consider this as an appropriate option necessary fully to appreciate concerns related to public sector labour relations in Canada. The CLC reiterated its request in its communication of 6 December 1991, mentioning that a further complaint against back-to-work legislation enacted by the federal Government against its public servants would soon be presented to the Committee. According to the CLC, this means that more than one-half million workers in Canada have had their basic rights denied or severely restricted by federal or provincial legislation.

B. The Government's reply

1. 478. In its communication of 7 April 1992, the Government of New Brunswick submits that the complaint is not supported either in fact or in law. It then explains the collective bargaining regime existing in New Brunswick, the rationale for and the effects of the Expenditure Management Act, 1991, and argues that this temporary Act was both justified in view of the particular circumstances prevailing in the Province, and compatible with the principles of freedom of association.
2. 479. New Brunswick public sector workers had never been subject to wage restraint legislation since they were granted collective bargaining rights in 1968; New Brunswick has been a leader in the granting of bargaining rights to public sector employees in Canada. The Act challenged by the complainant did not modify in any way the legislation governing bargaining in the public sector, namely the Public Service Labour Relations Act (the "PSLR Act"). The PSLR Act contains numerous provisions designed to protect unions and enhance relations between them and the Province, for example: section 5, allowing membership in a union by every employee; section 7, preventing managerial interference with employee organisations; section 8, preventing managerial discrimination against employee organisations; section 35, bargaining rights of unions; section 44, notice to bargain requiring parties to bargain collectively; section 45, requirement for good faith bargaining; section 46, preservation of terms and conditions of employment during bargaining; section 65, binding effect of collective agreements; section 92, adjudication of differences between employer and unions regarding collective bargaining rights.
3. 480. The complainant union, the New Brunswick Government Employees Union (NBGEU), is one of the ten certified bargaining agents in the public service of New Brunswick and a relative newcomer in this sector, having been certified in 1987 and 1988 respectively to represent two small groups of employees, 331 and 22 workers. By contrast, all the unions in the public sector represent more than 35,000 employees, regrouped in 38 bargaining units. The parties meet regularly to negotiate collective agreements, failing which they may mutually agree to submit the dispute to binding arbitration, leading to an arbitral award. In the history of collective bargaining in the public sector in New Brunswick there have only been two cases where the parties have utilised the arbitration process to reach agreement; in all other cases the parties themselves have freely concluded a collective agreement.
4. 481. According to the Government, the fact that the PSLR Act and the Industrial Relations Act are in no way affected by the terms of the Act highlights the purpose and intent of the Act; it is not, as suggested by the union, to "blame public sector workers for the provincial deficit" or to make them "'scapegoats' ... for the Province's economic difficulties", nor to "deny access to the courts", nor to "deny freedom of association" nor to "nullify legally signed agreements". The purpose of the Act is clearly set out in section 2, i.e.: (a) to delay by one year all increases, agreed to or reasonably anticipated, in the costs incurred by a public sector employer or a publicly funded employer in relation to the services performed under an agreement or arrangement to which this Act applies, and (b) to implement certain other expenditure management measures. The Government makes a number of comments on this provision.
5. 482. First, the Act does not nullify or abolish collective agreements or collective bargaining. The purpose and intent of the Act is to delay by one year, subject to certain exceptions, any increases in the Province's cost for wages and benefits. All other provisions of a collective agreement are preserved, only those provisions calling for monetary increases are suspended, and this for one year. Particular note should be made of section 20 of the Act which states that the Act "... ceases to have effect on the expiry of the agreements and arrangements to which it applies". It is clear then from the terms of the Act, that its effect is of limited duration. The Act is an exceptional measure designed to combat the Province's financial problems and is in no way designed or intended to infringe on or deny fundamental rights related to collective bargaining.
6. 483. Second, the Act is not intended to "blame" public sector employees. Indeed, it impacts on private sector employees as well as elected representatives, cabinet ministers, members of boards and tribunals, contract employees and consultants, political parties and members of various health care professions. However, while the Act affects a broad segment of society, it in no way attaches "blame" to these individuals for the Province's financial problems.
7. 484. Third, the Act is intended only to have financial implications. It does not affect any of the other provisions or terms and conditions of employment which may be contained in a collective agreement.
8. 485. Fourth, the Act is not aimed or designed to alter the system of collective bargaining in the Province, that being conducted under the PSLR Act and the Industrial Relations Act, the terms of which have not been altered.
9. 486. As regards the reasons for adopting the Act, the Government makes elaborate observations - supported by several documents - on the financial problems the Province was facing when the Bill was presented and which may be summarised as follows: an initial forecast deficit of $225 million for the fiscal year 1991-92, subsequently made worse by the federal budget; loss of transfer payments from the federal Government; expenditures growing at a rate faster than that anticipated; relatively low rate of growth in revenues due to an economic recession.
10. 487. If left unchecked, this deficit would have continued to worsen in the following years, as explained in a document entitled "Fiscal framework presentation 1991-92", which outlined four options for dealing with the problem, namely: relying on the federal Government; raising taxes; increasing provincial borrowing; and reducing the growth in spending. The Government points out that the $48 million which the Province anticipated would be saved by a one-year freeze in public service employees' wages represented only a small portion of the total effort to eliminate the projected deficit. It annexes a document prepared on 2 April 1991 detailing the various anticipated sources of savings to eliminate the deficit.
11. 488. The Government adds that it met with various business groups and organisations to seek their input in addressing the situation and that it held extensive public consultations across the Province. In addition, prior to the introduction of the budget in the Legislative Assembly, the various bargaining agents for the public service met with government officials and were briefed on the Province's emerging fiscal problems and the options for dealing with them. Subsequently, on 2 April 1991, the Minister of Finance tabled his budget in the Legislative Assembly together with an announcement that legislation would be introduced to freeze wages for a period of one year. On 25 April 1991 the various unions requested the Government to delay the introduction of this legislation, which was agreed to by the Government. Subsequent meetings were held with the various unions on 30 April, and 3 and 6 May prior to the introduction of the Bill in the Legislative Assembly on 7 May 1991. The Act was fully debated in the Legislative Assembly and became law on 9 May 1991. It should be noted that the Act was specifically amended in the Legislative Assembly by adding section 19 to the Act which states: "This Act ... comes into force on a day or days to be fixed by proclamation." This provision was designed to delay the implementation of the Act and provide a further period for discussions between the Province and the various bargaining agents as well as other publicly funded employers and their bargaining agents. Indeed, as a direct result of these discussions certain publicly funded employers and their bargaining agents reached agreement providing for a one-year wage freeze and thus were exempt from the application of the Act.
12. 489. The Government adds general observations on the particular situation of the Province which may be summarised as follows: New Brunswick is a relatively small Province with a population of only 725,000 persons; because of New Brunswick's reliance on its primary industries such as forestry, mining and fishing, the Province has been particularly susceptible to the adverse effects of a worldwide recession, particularly in the forestry industry. The Province relies on the federal Government for a large portion of its revenue; because the federal Government also encountered fiscal difficulties, this had resulted in a $127 million reduction in federal transfers. In addition, because of the worldwide recession, unemployment in the Province exceeded 12 per cent of the labour force, which had a twofold effect: reduced available revenue for consumers and reduced taxes; increased expenditure of health and welfare payments.
13. 490. In 1990 the total labour force employed was 291,000 and of this number 42,000 were employed directly by the Province or provincial government agencies. Because the Province is such a significant employer, the Government rejected any attempt to alleviate its financial problems through the laying off of employees. Estimating that achieving the kind of reductions that were required would have resulted in laying off 2,000 civil servants, it decided rather that a fairer course of action would be to freeze wages for one year and use normal staff turnover to effect a modest downsizing of the public service. Finally, because of New Brunswick's relatively low population base, the anticipated budgetary deficit on ordinary account of $225 million coupled with borrowing for capital projects of $335 million would have produced a dramatic increase in the provincial per capita debt.
14. 491. Turning to the principles of freedom of association, the Government refers to the various criteria elaborated by the Committee as regards the compatibility of economic stabilisation measures with international Conventions, namely: "stabilisation measures restricting the right to collective bargaining might be acceptable on condition that they are of an exceptional nature, and only to the extent that they are necessary, without exceeding a reasonable period, and that they are accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect workers' living standards". (222nd Report, para. 117.)
15. 492. The Act is indeed an exceptional measure since, as acknowledged by the complainant, New Brunswick public sector workers had never been subject to wage restraint legislation since they were granted collective bargaining rights in 1968. The Act was a necessary action taken in the best interests of the citizens of New Brunswick. Faced with competing choices and with a significant financial problem, the Government chose the option which was both fair and equitable and would, in the long term, benefit employees.
16. 493. The Government further underlines that the purpose and intent of the Act is only to postpone increases in expenditure on wage-related items. The Act does not impose wholesale cuts in worker wages or benefits, but merely serves to check the growth in the provincial government deficit brought about by external forces. Moreover, various other cuts were made in government programmes and expenditures in an effort to eliminate the significant projected deficit on ordinary account. These measures were thus adopted only to the extent necessary.
17. 494. In addition, it is clear from the terms of the Act that it operates only for a period of one year. By reason of section 20, the Act will automatically cease to have effect on any subsequent collective agreements.
18. 495. The Act also contains provisions which are designed to lessen its impact on low wage-earners. Firstly, section 9 allows employees to receive additional payments as a result of three particular types of payment, including payments as a result of the Pay Equity Act and increases in the minimum wage under the Employment Standards Act. The Pay Equity Act has the main effect of eliminating wage disparities between female employees who perform work of equal value to that of male employees. These female workers receive less than their male counterparts for work of equal value and generally occupy positions at the lower end of the wage scale. Hence, the Act was designed to ensure these workers continued to receive the full benefit of the Pay Equity Act. As well, the Act had no application to any increases in the minimum wage legislation and this exemption is self-explanatory.
19. 496. Moreover, under the terms of paragraph 14(1)(e) of the Act, the Lieutenant-Governor in Council was empowered to make regulations, inter alia, respecting exemptions from the Act. Utilising this authority, the Province has carried on extensive discussions with the various bargaining agents in an effort to design a programme ensuring that the Act would not adversely impact on low-income workers. Indeed, substantial agreement has been reached between the Province and the various bargaining units concerning the terms of these exempting provisions so as to lessen the impact on low wage-earners: the lump-sum payments to low wage-earners will be exempt from the provisions of the Act.
20. 497. In summary, the Government submits that:
    • (a) the Act is not designed in any way to affect the rights of unions and the legislation under which they operate namely, the Public Service Labour Relations Act and the Industrial Relations Act;
    • (b) the Act merely imposes a one-year freeze on any increase in the provincial wage bill;
    • (c) the Act was enacted as an exceptional measure to deal with pressing financial problems faced by the Province and was in no way intended to "punish" or "blame" workers for the serious financial problems encountered by the Province;
    • (d) the Act was designed to ensure that low wage-earners and other disadvantaged groups would not be penalised;
    • (e) the operation of the Act is expressly limited to one year;
    • (f) the legislation was introduced only after extensive consultation with the public and indeed was proclaimed only after extensive consultations with the various bargaining agents in an effort to explore all possible alternatives;
    • (g) the amount saved by the Provinces as a result of the application of the Act represented only a small portion of the overall savings effected by the Government in order to combat its financial problems;
    • (h) the Act was part of an overall programme designed to stabilise provincial finances;
    • (i) the Act also preserved the employment of over 2,000 employees whom the Government would have been compelled to lay off in order to achieve savings similar to that effected by a simple postponement of wage increases;
    • (j) the Act represents a first in the Province's history and was intended to be fiscal only in its operation;
    • (k) the Act will, by virtue of section 20, cease to have any effect on future collective agreements.

C. The Committee's conclusions

1. 498. The Committee notes that this case involves certain restrictions on collective bargaining for public sector workers in the Province of New Brunswick (Canada). The Government explains that its intervention was necessary in view of the difficult economic situation of the Province and that it is of a temporary nature, being limited to one year.
2. 499. Before turning to the merits of the complaint, the Committee refers to the comments it made in this report in relation to Case No. 1616 (Canada) as regards the general context in which this complaint was presented, and its views on economic arguments as a justification for restricting collective bargaining, which apply equally here with appropriate modifications.
3. 500. The Committee has acknowledged that economic stabilisation measures restricting collective bargaining rights are acceptable provided that they are of an exceptional nature, only to the extent that they are necessary, without exceeding a reasonable period and that they are accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect workers' living standards. (Digest, para. 641.) The Committee of Experts has adopted a similar approach on this issue (General Survey on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, 1983, para. 315).
4. 501. As regards the particulars of the case, the Committee notes that, as far as it is aware the New Brunswick Government has never before enacted such legislation restricting collective bargaining; the Act can thus be said at this point in time to be of an exceptional nature. Secondly, the general labour legislation has not been permanently repealed or amended. Thirdly, section 2(1) of the Act expressly states that its purpose and intent is to delay by one year all increases in the compensation paid to public servants and, under section 20, the Act ceases to have effect on the expiry of the agreements and arrangements to which it applies; while the exact duration of collective bargaining restrictions may vary by reason of the combined effect of these two provisions, it is reasonably clear that the Act is of a temporary nature. Fourthly, the Act embodies provisions affording some protection to the workers most likely to be affected and protects in particular legislative measures previously enacted to remedy wage disparities between men and women for work of equal value. In addition, and although the complainants consider that insufficient attention was paid to their proposals for addressing the Province's economic problems (the contents of these proposals however were not communicated to the Committee) it appears that the Government made efforts to consult various groups and bargaining agents, which in some cases led to agreements being concluded.
5. 502. The Committee regrets that the Government did not give priority to collective bargaining as a means to determine the conditions of employment of its public servants, but rather that it felt compelled to adopt the Expenditure Management Act, 1991. The Committee trusts that restrictions on collective bargaining will be limited to a one-year postponement of increases, and that unrestricted and free collective bargaining will resume thereafter.
6. 503. One provision of the Act raises some concern in that respect, namely section 13 which states that "Every agreement entered into or arbitral award rendered to amend or replace an agreement affected by this Act shall respect the purpose and intent of this Act and shall not attempt to compensate for the effects of this Act". While appreciating the rationale underlying section 13 of the Act and recognising that its wording allows some flexibility of interpretation, the Committee recalls that in order to gain and retain the parties' confidence any arbitration system should be truly independent, and that arbitrators' hands should not be tied by pre-established legislative criteria.
7. 504. In the view of the Committee, the expiry of the Act in the very near future should render possible a return to regular collective bargaining with recourse, where appropriate, to independent arbitration. The marked loss of confidence of the unions and other negative effects that the Act had on industrial relations could to some extent be offset by consideration being given by the Government in consultation with the trade unions, to ensuring that the collective bargaining and arbitration system enjoys the fullest confidence of the parties. The Committee invites the Government to take such measures.

ANNEX

1. Extracts of the Expenditure Management Act, 1991
2. 1. In this Act "collective agreement" means:
3. (a) a collective agreement or arbitral award under the Public Service Labour
4. Relations Act; and
5. (b) a collective agreement under the Industrial Relations Act entered into by
6. a publicly funded employer.
7. "Publicly funded employer" means a person or body listed in Schedule A, and
8. includes any person who, on behalf of a person or body so listed, has
9. authority to enter into any collective agreement or other agreement or
10. arrangement to which this Act applies;
11. "Public sector employer" means any person who, in relation to any division or
12. portion of the public service ... has authority to enter into any collective
13. agreement or other agreement or arrangement to which this Act applies.
14. 2(1) The purpose and intent of this Act is:
15. (a) to delay by one year all increases, agreed to or reasonably anticipated,
16. in the costs incurred by a public sector employer or a publicly funded
17. employer in relation to the services performed under an agreement or
18. arrangement to which this Act applies; and
19. (b) to implement certain other expenditure management measures.
20. 2(2) This Act prevails over the terms of any other Act or of any regulation,
21. obligation, right, claim, agreement, appointment or arrangement whatsoever.
22. 2(3) This act binds the Crown.
23. 3(1) This section applies to:
24. (a) every collective agreement that is in force on the commencement of this
25. Act;
26. (b) every collective agreement ratified before 1 May 1991 in replacement of a
27. collective agreement that had expired before the commencement of this Act; and
28. (c) every collective agreement that has expired before the commencement of
29. this Act, but contains terms and conditions of employment that, on the
30. commencement of this Act, remain in force by virtue of section 46 of the
31. Public Service Labour Relations Act or section 35 of the Industrial Relations
32. Act.
33. 3(2) The duration of every collective agreement to which this section applies
34. is extended by one year.
35. 3(3) Where a collective agreement to which this section applies contains terms
36. providing for an increased payment or a new payment to be made by the employer
37. as from 1 April 1991 or any later date, those terms take effect one year after
38. the date specified in the collective agreement.
39. 3(4) All other terms of a collective agreement to which this section applies
40. take effect as specified in the collective agreement.
41. ...
42. 5(1) Where a first collective agreement is entered into in relation to a
43. bargaining unit within one year after the commencement of this Act, no term of
44. the collective agreement requiring an increased payment or a new payment to be
45. made by the employer shall take effect earlier than one year after the
46. certification of the bargaining agent.
47. 5(2) Where, in consequence of subsection (1), the date on which a term of a
48. collective agreement takes effect is delayed by a period of time:
49. (a) the date on which any other term of the collective agreement providing for
50. an increased payment or a new payment to be made by an employer takes effect
51. is delayed by the same period of time; and
52. (b) the duration of the collective agreement is extended by that period of
53. time.
54. 6(1) Except where some other provision of this Act applies, this section
55. applies to every contract of employment to which, on the commencement of this
56. Act, a publicly funded employer or a public sector employer is a party.
57. ...
58. 6(3) Where a contract to which this section applies contains terms providing
59. for an increased payment or a new payment to be made by the employer as from 1
60. April 1991 or any later date:
61. (a) those terms take effect one year after the date specified in the contract
62. if the contract is still in force then; and
63. (b) those terms do not take effect if the contract is not still in force then.
64. 6(4) Where a contract to which this section applies does not contain terms
65. described in subsection (3), no increase in the rates of payment applicable
66. under the contract may take effect less than two years after the previous
67. increase in rates of payment.
68. ...
69. 9. Notwithstanding anything in this Act, an individual may receive additional
70. payments in consequence of:
71. (a) promotion, reclassification or periodic or performance-related progression
72. within an established pay range;
73. (b) the Pay Equity Act; or
74. (c) increases in the minimum wage under the Employment Standards Act.
75. ...
76. 13. Every agreement entered into or arbitral award rendered to amend or
77. replace an agreement affected by this Act shall respect the purpose and intent
78. of this Act and shall not attempt to compensate for the effects of this Act.
79. 14(1) The Lieutenant-Governor in Council may make regulations:
80. (a) defining terms used in this Act;
81. (b) making additions to, deletions from or amendments to Schedule A;
82. (c) applying this Act to agreements or arrangements not expressly mentioned in
83. this Act;
84. (d) respecting the manner in which the intent and purpose of this act is to be
85. realised in relation to agreements or arrangements to which this Act applies
86. by virtue of regulations under paragraph (c);
87. (e) respecting exemptions from this Act or any of its provisions;
88. (f) respecting the determination of questions arising as to the interpretation
89. or application of this Act;
90. (g) respecting any matter considered necessary or advisable for carrying out
91. the purpose and intent of this Act; and
92. (h) generally, for the purposes of this Act.
93. 14(2) Regulations under subsection (1) may be made with retroactive effect.
94. ...
95. 17. (...)
96. (1) The Minister may reduce a municipality's unconditional grant:
97. (a) if the municipality has not made arrangements, satisfactory to the
98. Minister, for passing on to the Minister the savings accruing to the
99. municipality in consequence of the Expenditure Management Act, 1991; or
100. (b) if arrangements described in paragraph (a) have been made, but the
101. municipality has not complied with them.
102. ...
103. 20. This Act ceases to have effect on the expiry of the agreements and
104. arrangements to which it applies.