



SECOND ITEM ON THE AGENDA

Evaluations**(b) Independent evaluation of the ILO's strategy for employment-intensive investment****I. Introduction**

1. This evaluation analyses the ILO's implementation of its strategy to support member States to integrate employment and social policy concerns into public and private investment policy in the infrastructure and construction sector, taking into account particular characteristics of the ILO's operational strategy for Outcome 2b.2.¹ This strategy is referred to as the Employment Intensive Investment Strategy (EIIS). It is technically supported primarily by the Employment Sector, the SROs and two regional technical units based in Harare and Bangkok.
2. The evaluation was conducted in line with the ILO's evaluation framework, endorsed by the Governing Body in November 2005 (GB.294/8/1(Rev.)). In accordance with ILO guidelines for independence, credibility and transparency, responsibility for the evaluation was based in the Evaluation Unit. The evaluation was conducted in mid-2006 and covered the period 2000-05.² The evaluation team was composed of an external lead evaluator and an official of the ILO Evaluation Unit; neither have prior links to the strategy.
3. Information has been drawn from four main sources: a desk-based review on selected projects and programme documentation, and previous evaluation studies; interviews at the ILO; questionnaires to ILO staff and knowledgeable external sources (e.g. in other United Nations agencies, bilateral or programme consultants); and field missions to South-East Asia and southern Africa (country case studies were in Cambodia, Madagascar, Philippines, and South Africa).

¹ Outcome 2b.2: ILO constituents and key stakeholders integrate employment and social policy concerns into public and private investment policy in the infrastructure and construction sector. Taken from the ILO's *Programme and Budget for 2006-07*.

² This is a summary of the full evaluation report, which can be read at www.ilo.org/eval.

II. Vision and strategy

4. The ILO programme to support employment-intensive investment was created in the mid-1970s as part of the ILO's response to the deteriorating employment situation in developing countries, and as a response to emergencies. The employment investment programme expanded considerably in the 1980s and at the end of the decade accounted for a significant part of the ILO's programme in technical cooperation. In the early 1990s, EIIS was scaled down in the ILO, leading to a reduction in staffing and resources.
5. From the end of the 1990s, the EIIS has moved towards the policy level, to link policy with the international financial institutions, and towards development of partnerships with other United Nations organizations (e.g. the UNOPS, WFP, UNDP and UN-HABITAT) and education institutions within countries. The strategy promotes policy and small enterprise development and encourages communities to develop through access to productive resources and social services. Sustainable national capacities and conducive policy environments are seen as essential ingredients for long-term impact.
6. A breakdown of regular budget resources since 2000 is provided in table 1 in the appendix. Extra-budgetary resources supporting decent employment expenditures for EIIS have accounted for roughly 20-25 per cent. In contrast, over much of the evaluation period, its regular budget comprised 4-5 per cent of the Employment Sector's regular budget.
7. In line with the ILO's new programme framework beginning in 2000, the EIIS approach also evolved into an integrated strategy that supported complementary organizational activities, with a reorganization that aligned it with crisis response, which later evolved to emphasize its role in employment strategies. In March 2006, the unit supporting this strategy (EMP/INVEST) was situated in the newly created Employment Policy Department.

III. Findings and lessons learned

Overall findings

8. The evaluation finds the EIIS employing an impressive range of effective techniques and experience, and generating many country-level successes over the last 25 years. Programme staff has been and are highly dedicated and have done a commendable job. The EIIS is situated in an area where there is now a high political profile for its techniques and services. In a number of countries, it has made significant inroads into mainstreaming the techniques across the range of investment decisions made on infrastructure. The results have been quite encouraging in those environments where governments have deliberately taken the conscious decision to promote EIIS as another strategy against poverty and unemployment (and this includes three of the case study countries). The greatest challenges exist in launching a coordinated effort to upscale and mainstream employment-intensive investment policies and programmes.

EIIS builds on the ILO's comparative strengths and strategic positioning but lacks leverage to bring about large-scale change

9. There are increasing indications that employment-intensive approaches are achieving a higher political profile, particularly in Africa, and that investment in infrastructure development in general is used as a major instrument for reduction of poverty. The debate

on employment, growth and globalization has also intensified since the publication of the World Commission's report on the social dimension of globalization. Many donors have renewed their interest in infrastructure investments generating rural economic activity and boosting livelihoods.

10. The ILO's EIIS remains very relevant to the larger international development effort, with its emphasis on employment, poverty reduction and protection of workers in infrastructure development through application of standards. Its niche lies in the depth of knowledge and experience it extends through advisory and information services, training and other support. This know-how also lends itself well to emergency response in post-crisis contexts.
11. The ILO has the mandate and expertise to carry out the objectives of the programme but lacks the full leverage to bring about the policy and institutional change needed without more commitment and support from key influential institutions at global, regional and national levels. To mainstream the EIIS approach throughout all areas of infrastructural development requires influencing governments and major lenders to change their policies and practices.
12. In sum, the ILO as an organization has achieved much. However, despite it having the mandate and technical competence, it lacks sufficient institutional leverage to trigger major policy changes on a grand scale.

Regional and global action has not yet mainstreamed employment-intensive approaches in key development organizations

13. As stated in its strategy, the EIIS aims to influence at global and regional levels key organizations to advocate, raise awareness and mobilize resources for employment- and local resource-based approaches in infrastructure investment. It can be said that the ILO is active at regional and global levels with the prominent groups working in this technical area. The Office has worked with university and research networks among others to develop knowledge and knowledge-based advocacy. The ILO has worked with UN partners and industry associations to influence changes in procurement systems and community-level interventions.
14. Its influence, however, appears to be limited by the unevenness of its engagement, which in turn is driven by resource constraints. With a large country-level technical cooperation programme, attention is focused on effectively managing these interventions. Developing strategies and partnerships at regional and global levels has been uneven. One reason for this has been the need to reconcile differences in business processes prior to formalizing memoranda of understanding with the UN and IFI partners. Global constituents are not yet realizing their potential in reinforcing EIIS initiatives across their members in such areas as establishing good practices for small-scale contracting and community-level monitoring.

Operational strategy and interventions at country level are technically sound and highly regarded

15. Operational strategies are built on well-defined "entry points". In itself, EIIS identifies a three-tier approach (micro, meso and macro) with interventions required at all three levels, each level reinforcing the others. Implementation of the full EIIS approach, which is based on a needs assessment, demonstration projects and public and private sector capacity building for full application, has a long time frame and is estimated to take, as a minimum,

five to seven years and as long as 12 years to complete and withdraw with a fairly sustainable programme.

16. Independent external observers reported major successes with the short-term context of many activities: projects did help increase employment creation and incomes in rural areas, there was good involvement of women in the projects, the material and training generated was very effective and in particular the integrated rural accessibility planning (IRAP) tool was valuable. At project levels, ample evidence has been produced to show that the interventions are highly regarded as mechanisms to reduce poverty through employment and improved local economic activity. The EIIS's contribution to building up a cadre of small business entrepreneurs also bodes well for a second round of income-generation effects.
17. The ILO has done much to demonstrate the effectiveness of EIIS techniques, however, some concerns also were found. The ILO's employment-intensive construction methods, while having proven technically sound, seem to be disadvantaged by long-held national and international concerns about the management intensity for government institutions and their contractors, and perceived risks linked to the relatively slow disbursement of funds. In some countries there are perceptions of the methodology being donor-driven rather than nationally owned. Finally, corruption remains a major problem within infrastructure investment and there is some resistance to the increased transparency associated with these methods, particularly given the range of EIIS management tools for effective management and local governance.

EIIS contributes to national and international development frameworks in selected countries

18. In addition to the direct link to poverty reduction targets of the Millennium Development Goals, the EIIS also supports those linked to improved access to basic goods and services that directly improve the livelihoods of poor households, primarily in rural areas.
19. In terms of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and poverty reduction strategies (PRSs), generally the ILO, as a specialized agency, has faced obstacles to establishing a high profile, but of the four case study countries visited there was welcome inclusion of ILO and EIIS in the UNDAF (South Africa) and the PRS successor, the Madagascar Action Plan. EIIS is a core strategy of Cambodia's national poverty reduction strategy (NPRS), and is included in the two most recent medium-term Philippines development plans.
20. The EIIS, as reflected across the ILO, is beginning to incorporate the new aid architecture of UNDAF and PRSs but more could be done. EIIS is also being integrated into the national employment strategies embedded in decent work country programmes (DWCPs). Table 2 lists DWCPs in which 2006 implementation plans list employment-intensive investment as a major outcome. For the 2006-07 biennium, the ILO plans to implement components of EIIS in 35 countries.
21. Over the past five years, the ILO has been working at various levels of effort to promote EIIS in roughly 50 countries. In all, about US\$50 million has been invested since 2000 through extra-budgetary supported projects and an additional \$5 million in regular budget. As figure 1 suggests, Africa has received the majority of project resources.

Evidence of outcomes and impact on key organizations

22. Regarding impact, there are overall observations that can be made from the review. First, many of the positive aspects of the EIIS are still current, its tools and approaches are effective, but also the difficulties that have hampered its development still apply. There is still an uphill task to convince governments of the need for employment-intensive investment and to set up the institutions and change in mind-set needed for this to happen. In some countries, EIIS has remained at the demonstration stage for several years without the required scaling up, and is seen by some as the old fashioned “public works” view that provided temporary and unsustainable employment and that the quality of the assets created was poor. The programme has still not managed to entirely throw off that erroneous view of its work. Another obvious challenge is the continued high levels of corruption linked to infrastructure investment, which EIIS tries to address through transparent financial and contract management.
23. Second, the usual programme partners are not the ILO traditional groups but those who see benefits in the employment-intensive approach: municipalities, community groups, small-scale contractors, sectoral ministries and ministries of finance, planning, decentralization and local government. Case studies indicated considerable project-level success in mainstreaming EIIS practices across these groups, but some reversion to old practices after project completion, at least in some of the countries. But the political will and commitment is moving towards employment-intensive investment and infrastructure development in a major way.

Involvement of the ILO constituents not widespread

24. Many of the achievements happened without the full participation of the ILO’s tripartite partners as the nature of the programme lent itself more effectively to the participation of other partners. The traditional tripartite system does not line up with all development situations and this is one of them; but when the partners have participated, they demonstrate their potential to contribute to its greater success. Nonetheless, EIIS lacks a critical mass of robust ILO constituents for the initiative and is weakened because of this.

IV. Management and organizational performance

Programme coordination and integration at country level needs strengthening

25. Within the Office-wide effort to support the EIIS, the evaluators noted issues related to the field structure, primarily related to lines of authority in decision-making, resource management, as well as hard and soft reporting lines. Also, the initiatives in Cambodia, which is without an ILO field office, are disadvantaged by the absence of ILO country-level representation. This was found to inhibit internal collaboration and coordination on project planning and implementation, as well as resource mobilization.
26. At the administrative level, there are inconsistencies between basic operations taking too long to complete at the same time that tough demands are made to meet deadlines. There were many comments that as much as 30 per cent of the time of technical advisers was taken up with administrative matters.

27. Likewise, administrative support to promote external collaboration and longer term partnerships for EIIS was largely absent. On the ground, the ILO would benefit from better defined and more strategic collaboration with the UNOPS, UNDP, UN-HABITAT and IFAD. For the UNOPS and UNDP particularly, the ILO could explore how to use their local administrative capacities, thereby freeing up ILO capacities to support delivery of technical assistance. Currently, examples of effective collaboration are somewhat isolated and the ILO's participation too short term to sufficiently integrate standards and protection into local resource-based approaches.
28. It is acknowledged that the ILO is aware of these issues and this is under active review. The current structure is not serving EIIS well. The ILO field structure can pay greater attention to placing more employment specialists in the field to have greater strategic thinking particularly in integrated employment programmes and policies.

Results-based practices and performance indicators weakly applied

29. Based on the programme and budget objectives set for the strategy, it has achieved its objectives, but it must be emphasized within the context of rather weak Office-wide criteria. The programme and budget indicators for 2006-07 reflect key performance aspects of the strategy, but are not well defined or easily measured. The EIIS has four more focused immediate objectives that relate more closely to operations, and country-level methodology against which to monitor performance; it is infrequently applied due in part to cost and time requirements. In general, the evaluation found regular monitoring and reporting of progress against country-level strategies to be weak.
30. At project level, methodologies are not consistently in place to establish baseline situations and organizational needs for sustainability of capacities and practices within national agencies. In addition, in the case of contracting, it is recommended that tracking studies be conducted on contractors trained, and rapid appraisals used to assess adherence to labour use and working conditions in construction contracts as specified in the terms. In general, during implementation, there can be less adherence to outputs and more assessment of processes being followed, noting weaknesses and risks to address.
31. The EIIS places appropriate emphasis on increasing access by women and the marginalized to the benefits of employment-intensive infrastructure investments at local levels. Its tools and methodologies are gender sensitive, though some could be refined to better address gender mainstreaming. Improvements to monitoring and reporting practices could increase the transparency of gender differences in participation and benefits linked to interventions, particularly at the levels of managers, contractors and other professionals.

V. Recommendations

32. The EIIS is clearly a technical success but there are problems with reforming institutional practices. All recommendations in this section reflect the understanding that new approaches must be sought to trigger and accelerate mainstreaming at global and national levels.

For the Office:

- The EIIS must take cognizance of the new aid architecture, both within ILO (DWCPs) and outside (UNDAF, PRSs, social funds, SWAPs, budget support) so that as changes in aid architecture progress, the Office might be ready to maximize the

employment aspects of infrastructural development in the funding arrangements. To ensure that the ILO's expertise in employment promotion through infrastructure development is adequately developed in national analytical and planning processes (especially national employment policies and employment guarantee schemes), it should work within the United Nations development framework, and follow this up with integrated proposals for rural development and employment planning. The EIIS should give priority to situations where it can link into PRS-UNDAF and DWCP, and use the funds available to scale up their programmes with government support.

- The Office should set a tighter and demand driven focus for its work. From the start, the “scale-up” modality should be recognized and built into programming with the setting of demanding milestones. Member governments need to be made aware that EIIS is a well tried and tested product developed over many years. If governments wish to take up its services, they must commit to achieving certain milestones so that the Office can accelerate divestment of responsibility. Likewise, EIIS should be wound down in countries which are not amenable to tighter priority setting and where governments do not wish to make this a national mainstreamed priority.
- The ILO must regard its role in EIIS as that of a United Nations specialized agency mandated to provide tools, standards, and policy advice. This implies greater efforts in seeking extra-budgetary funding focused on testing and evolving good practice, and working more closely with implementing agencies that can provide a presence on the ground (e.g. NGOs).
- The dialogue with donors should be oriented towards areas such as budget support, and EIIS should continue building alliances with the appropriate government departments. In budget support, donors provide financial support to good socially inclusive and poverty-focused national plans. Therefore, the construction techniques to be used should be considered by the implementing government department and planning/finance ministries through employment-oriented cost-benefit analysis of investments and fiscal policies.
- To better support EIIS, the Office should build longer term and more strategic partnerships with agencies such as the UNOPS, UNDP, UN-HABITAT, IFAD and the European Union, and the ILO should work with these agencies as a means of spreading the techniques and philosophy of EIIS.
- Major international development funders of infrastructure should have memoranda of understanding with the ILO on collaboration in this area. Such collaboration can aim to influence the proportion of major construction investments to be geared towards the development of local businesses, local economies and local job creation. The ILO should advance contracting procedures and practices that promote decent jobs and simultaneously provide access for local businesses to construction contracts or require large international construction companies that win contracts in developing countries to work more with local industry.
- The EIIS and its achievements are not well communicated and a stronger documentation and communications effort should be made.
- The EIIS should see as a priority the building of demand for local industry to gain a larger share of contracts. Greater attention can be paid to market incentives and business needs (i.e. cost-benefit analysis). The EIIS team should work more closely with the relevant enterprise and employment-creation sections of the ILO to do this.
- More attention should be given to regular performance reporting. The Office should ensure a solid information base, including to support a strategy evaluation requiring

substantial information needs. More systematic tracking of strategy and progress over time, and particularly across projects, is needed both at global and national levels.

- Some improvement should be made in gender mainstreaming: increasing the role of women as technical staff, contractors and managers; training of officials in how to manage gender-sensitive local contracting; more explicit incorporation of gender and vulnerability aspects in the IRAP tool; and more regular gender- and vulnerable group-disaggregated reporting on participation rates.

For Governments, employers' and workers' organizations:

- Governments should recognize that EIIS reflects 25 years of tried and tested experience and techniques; they should be amenable to taking the steps for its success according to a strict timetable of milestones. This recommendation is made in the context of the new aid architecture where reasonable efforts are being made by the donor community to more closely support national priorities in a harmonized manner.
- Both employers' and workers' organizations could make a much more significant contribution to EIIS. Employers' organizations should be working on a focused strategy to identify gaps in the institutional policies and the skills, incentives or practices that are required to provide opportunities for large numbers of small enterprises. This could be a niche to encourage contractors or business managers to engage more fully, or encourage training for certain types of skills – skills that aim to support their government's employment policies.
- Workers' organizations should similarly identify niches they can fill, such as support to unemployed groups, advice on labour standards and job opportunities through networking with other groups. Collaboration at community level could target local monitoring of contracting and procurement practices.

VI. The Office's response to the EIIS evaluation

- 33.** The Office welcomes the conclusions and recommendations contained in the summary of the independent evaluation of the ILO's strategies for employment-intensive investment. It generally accepts the findings with respect to the Employment-Intensive Investment Programme's (EIIP) approach and impact, and welcomes the recommendations proposed for its future direction.
- 34.** The evaluation acknowledges the impressive range of techniques and experiences developed by the programme over the last 25 years, its country-level impact, its contribution to global goals such as MDGs and its ability to evolve in response to a changing development environment.
- 35.** The report underlines the higher political profile that investments in infrastructure development are currently assuming as a major instrument for poverty reduction. The evaluation and its discussion present therefore an opportunity to better leverage the EIIP strategy for advancing the Decent Work Agenda.
- 36.** The evaluation also points out that the ILO's tripartite constituents can make further strategic contribution to supporting and scaling up employment-intensive investment strategies in infrastructure development at the country level.
- 37.** The Office has the following observations and plans for follow-up.

- 38.** The report acknowledges the EIIP's valuable work at both the policy and operational levels, and underscores the important work done by the programme in establishing operational country programmes and defining tools and methodologies for employment-intensive investment approaches in cooperation with other development partners. Regarding the evaluation's assessment that the EIIP could be better used to leverage investment programmes supported by other United Nations and partner organizations, including international financial institutions (IFIs) in favour of job creation, the Office observes that there are several examples of collaboration with regional banks (e.g. Asian Development Bank (ADB) on poverty reduction trust funds, Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) on community programmes) and United Nations agencies (e.g. World Food Programme (WFP), UN-HABITAT) where ILO approaches and methodologies are applied. The Office recognizes, however, the need to strengthen and expand cooperation with the United Nations system, IFIs and development partners to support employment impact and investment climate assessments, infrastructure-support facilities and other areas where policy leverage could be improved.
- 39.** The evaluation recommends that the ILO should take as priority situations where employment-intensive investment strategies link into PRSP-UNDAF and DWCP processes. The Office sees employment-intensive investment strategies as a catalyst for integrated action in the framework of DWCPs. Within the framework of the "Vision" document on operationalizing the employment component of DWCPs (GB295/ESP/1/1: Employment strategies for decent work country programmes: Concepts, approaches and tools for implementing the Global Employment Agenda) discussed by the Governing Body in March 2006, the Office will continue its systematic review of EIIP involvement in each of the DWCPs and thereby more carefully scrutinize the potential for upscaling into broader national policy frameworks.
- 40.** The evaluation calls for greater selectivity, more emphasis to be laid on strategic project streams and less on operational programme management with its accompanying administrative burdens. The Office observes that the comparative advantage of the EIIP is its ability to link policy advice with operational impact through demonstration projects, and that these programmes and projects increasingly are delivered within agreed national development frameworks. The Office will make every effort to explore joint implementation arrangements with United Nations agencies and other development partners. In practice, it is not always possible to de-link strategic, technical and administrative aspects of project development.
- 41.** The Office agrees with the recommendation that the programme needs to expand and strategically mobilize additional extra-budgetary resources in order to meet its ambitions for continuous knowledge development and to maintain ILO's role as a centre of excellence. The Office observes however that there is a direct link between regular budget resources allocated to the programme and its ability to mobilize extra-budgetary resources.
- 42.** The Office observes that the evaluation does not dwell in-depth with the issue of crisis response. It should be pointed out that there is an increasing demand from ILO constituents for rapid response to post-crisis reconstruction and for the essential and strategic role that EIIP plays in ILO's integrated response. While the ability to provide such short-term response has significant resource implications, evidence has shown that these post-crisis programmes can provide an efficient investment for long-term policy impact.
- 43.** In summary, the Office intends to further analyse the content of this report between the field and headquarters units with a view to strengthening the ILO's work in the following areas:

- (i) promoting systematic employment impact assessment of public and private investment programmes and policies to enhance EIIP's selectivity and support to the development of strategic project streams;
- (ii) strengthening the Office's integrated policy advice and tools in the fields of employment creation and social protection through support to high quality and cost-effective public and community investment programmes as a social transfer mechanism;
- (iii) strengthening the private sector's role in employment creation, both through small-scale domestic enterprise development, through improved contracting and procurement policies and practices, and through integrating employment creation into the economic and financial strategies of those offering and receiving foreign direct investment; and
- (iv) strengthening the visibility of the EIIP within global and regional initiatives and devising and implementing an improved communication and advocacy strategy.

44. *The Committee may wish to recommend to the Governing Body that it endorse the above priority areas and that it request the Director-General to take into consideration the above findings and recommendations, together with the deliberations of the Committee, in order to match the above strategic priorities with required funding, including through programming and budget decisions.*

Geneva, 6 October 2006.

Point for decision: Paragraph 44.

Appendix

Table 1. Regular budget and PSI allocations to EMP/INVEST in US\$ '000 (actual US\$)

Biennium	Number of positions		Regular budget			PSI	Total
	Professional	General Service	Staff	Non-staff	Total		
2000-01	3	2	884	193	1 077	650	1 727
2002-03	3	2	1 095	202	1 297	562	1 859
2004-05	3	2	1 371	178	1 549	610	2 159
2006-07	3	2	1 346	183	1 529	303	1 832

Source: BUDGET, ILO programme and budget documents.

Table 2. Breakdown of major country-level interventions based on implementation plans, 2006-07, categorized by policy areas

Country	Key policy areas – GEA “Vision document”	Employment and investments	Infrastructure for jobs and decent work	Crisis response	Resource level
Burundi	2, 3, 4, 6		☐	☐	*
Cameroon	1, 2, 3	☐	☐		**
Congo	1, 2, 3	☐	☐		*
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	2, 3, 4, 6		☐	☐	*
Egypt	2, 3, 4	☐	☐		*
Ethiopia	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	☐	☐	☐	**
Gabon	1, 2, 3	☐	☐		*
Ghana	1, 2, 3	☐	☐		*
Kenya	1, 2, 3	☐	☐		*
Madagascar	1, 2, 3, 5	☐	☐		***
Mali	1, 2, 3, 5	☐	☐		***
Mauritania	2, 3		☐		*
Mozambique	1, 2, 3, 5	☐	☐		*
Rwanda	2, 3		☐		**
Somalia	2, 3, 4, 5, 6		☐	☐	***
South Africa	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	☐	☐		***
Sudan	2, 3, 4, 5, 6		☐	☐	*
Zambia	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	☐	☐		*
Zimbabwe	2, 3		☐		*
Regional Africa	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	☐	☐	☐	*
Afghanistan	1, 2, 3, 5		☐		**
Azerbaijan	2		☐		*
Cambodia	1, 2, 3, 5		☐		***
Indonesia	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	☐	☐	☐	***
Iraq	1, 4, 6	☐		☐	*
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.	2, 3, 5		☐		**
Nepal	1, 2, 3, 5	☐	☐		*
Pakistan	4, 6			☐	*
Sri Lanka	2, 3, 4, 5, 6		☐	☐	***
Southern Asia	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	☐	☐	☐	*

	Country	Key policy areas – GEA “Vision document”	Employment and investments	Infrastructure for jobs and decent work	Crisis response	Resource level
The Americas	Bolivia	1, 2, 3		☑		*
	Brazil	1, 2, 3	☑	☑		*
	Guatemala	1, 2, 3, 4	☑	☑	☑	*
	Haiti	4, 6		☑	☑	*
	Honduras	1, 2, 3	☑	☑		*
	Nicaragua	1, 2, 3, 4	☑	☑		*
	Paraguay	1, 2, 3	☑	☑		*

Legend: Key policy areas, Employment Sector (GB.295/ESP/1/1):

- 1: Economic policies for employment expansion.
- 2: Skills, technology and employability.
- 3: Enterprise development.
- 4: Labour market institutions and policies.
- 5: Governance, empowerment and organizational capital.
- 6: Social protection.

Resource level (RB and TC):


* less than US\$500,000.

** \$500,000-2,000,000.

*** more than \$2,000,000.

Source: Constructed by EVAL (using IRIS/SMM data) and EMP/INVEST.

Figure 1. Annual allocations of extra-budgetary funds for employment-intensive investment projects by region



Source: CODEV.